Political Analysis

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The Zionists, ever since outbreak of the Aqsa intifada on 28/9/2001, have been preoccupied in thinking of plans, programs and mechanisms by which they could confront escalation of Palestinian intifada and resistance. The Zionist political street, horrified by continuation of resistance operations, was primarily concerned with the position towards the Palestinian Authority and its chief Yasser Arafat.

The former Barak government had evaded evaluating or voicing certain descriptions of the PA and preferred to continue negotiating with it while the intifada was flaring. Yet Sharon and his government had another view, considering the PA “a terrorist entity”. They preferred indulging in security rather than political talks with the PA opining that political negotiations could not be made with the PA before it was politically “rehabilitated” and before it renounced violence as means for negotiations.

Sharon, who promised his people to regain them security within 100 days of assuming premiership, was compelled to search for a party to be held responsible for running the intifada and resistance operations. This was particularly important because his program for political talks with the PA was not expected to win success because it offered a gradual and limited implementation of transitional issues especially the third re-deployment stage while postponing the issues of refugees and Al-Quds (Jerusalem) in the final status talks to an indefinite date.

As long as the PA would not accept Sharon’s program, because its ceiling was much less than that offered by his predecessor Barak, Sharon sought to steer his political and media efforts to attacking the PA and charging it with what he called “terrorism” in addition to ignoring its security role stipulated in the Oslo agreements. This was meant to throw the ball in the PA’s court and focus the efforts on the security question in its capacity as the only means for initiation of political negotiations. Sharon, his government and army described the PA and its chief as no longer a “partner” in the peace process, called Arafat “a liar” and “deceitful” in addition to charging him of supporting and encouraging “terrorism”, compared him to “Ben Laden” and finally considered the positive aspects of Arafat’s absence from the arena as more than the negative ones as far as the Zionist entity was concerned.

The occupation government’s frank and clear expression that its army had planned practical schemes to wipe out the PA was voiced after escalation of resistance attacks and failure of the so-called “ceasefire agreements”, which were drafted under American patronage, in limiting those attacks and the PA’s clear inability to shoulder the Zionists’ desired security role.

The question here is how serious are the Sharon government’s threats? And whether they are true warning or merely leaked to the media to pressure the PA?

We must first of all point out that Sharon government’s stance vis-à-vis the peace process had led to complete stoppage in political talks and concentration on security negotiations that focused on the Tenet doctrine. This is what the Sharon government wants exactly, namely to draw the attention away from its obstinacy and intransigence and to focus the international attention on the security situation and the Zionist demands to halt the intifada and resistance. No doubt the Zionist government’s formation, which leans towards extreme right, has boosted such a trend especially when the labor party ministers led by Peres have accepted to be executors of Sharon’s policies in an attempt to preserve their popularity after losing the last Knesset elections.

Sharon and his government do not view the PA as a real “partner” contrary to the Barak government that maintained political negotiations with the PA until its last moments. Sharon is still retaining his old view of the PLO since the Beirut war and refused to change it in addition to the fact that his views coincide with those of the fanatic religious parties in the Zionist government. Even in the cases in which Sharon agreed to engage in political talks with the PA, he aimed at exploiting his foreign minister Shimon Peres in dragging the PA into accepting his security demands. He also wished to preserve continuation of the present coalition government and not gamble his possible loss in the event he ignored Peres’ constant proposals to meet Arafat. Moreover, Peres’ continuation as the enemy’s foreign minister would greatly contribute in lessening the international criticism of that government for Peres could market the right government’s policies through his special media capabilities and the status he enjoys in the West as a “peace monger”.

Sharon’s stand towards the PA was boosted after Zionist security agencies, especially the military intelligence, considered that PA chief was directly responsible for escalation of resistance operations against occupation and that he was intentionally ignoring them or even giving indirect orders for Fatah and other organizations to launch more operations. This role makes his presence at head of the PA a danger to the Zionist entity particularly when he controls all areas under his rule, according to those agencies. However, Zionist internal intelligence (Shabak) had a different viewpoint since it considered Arafat’s control on his areas was not absolute and that he was exerting efforts to end the intifada but the Palestinian internal situation and political conditions did not help him. The surprise was in publishing the new Shabak reports last October stipulating that Arafat’s absence from the arena carried more benefit than harm for the Zionist entity. Hebrew papers carried last July details of the reports including reasons that led to considering Arafat as an assistant factor in solving the historic dispute and reasons making him a barrier in the path of a peace settlement. In an eye-catching conclusion, the reports set five reasons for retaining Arafat and 17 reasons to get rid of him! Among the most important reasons for retaining him were “his position as a higher authority for Palestinians, his ability to adopt difficult resolutions and to challenge the Islamists’ control and that without him chaos would prevail.”

Meanwhile, the most important reasons for getting rid of him were: “he is a dangerous leader” and “does not enjoy enough credibility” with the Zionists and could lead the region to a catastrophe and could threaten collapse of relations with Egypt and Jordan in addition to endangering stability of those two countries” and he was still depending on “terrorism” as means to achieve his goals and that “he did not wish to offer concessions on central issues.”

Apparently, those speculations were not limited to Zionist security agencies and far-right groups as Barak in a recent conference in Tel Aviv University, reported by Zionist daily ‘Ma’ariv’ on 11 July admitted that the “Oslo march has collapsed”. He also held Arafat “responsible for the collapse of the Oslo march”. Barak supported the Sharon government’s policies saying, “I agree with the work principles led by Sharon and Ben Eliazer”. In another interview published by ‘Newsweek’ and ‘Washington Post’ on 15 July Barak renewed his backing to the Sharon government’s policy and the possibility of launching a large-scale ground operation against the PA but he proposed that “it should not be carried out unless as a last resort and after Israel wins international support for such an operation.”

As far as the Zionist popular mood was concerned, a recent opinion poll conducted by Gallup institute and published in daily ‘Ma’ariv’ on 20/7 reported that 55% of Zionists were generally satisfied with performance of their premier Ariel Sharon.

It is clear from the aforementioned that intransigence was prevailing in the Zionist street and parties along with the wish to direct a strong blow to the PA. This furnished the Sharon government with fertile grounds to persist in escalation and aggression schemes against the Palestinian people. Hence, leaking the occupation army’s plans to the press could not only be considered as a test balloon for the PA but rather a reflection of true plans that are being seriously studied with certain parts being actually carried out.

There is a noticeable difference here between Sharon government’s continuation in directing violent blows to intifada and resistance cadres in addition to a number of PA security headquarters and between waging an all-out war that aims at destroying and terminating presence of the PA. This last trend is governed by a number of considerations on the part of the Zionists:

The effectiveness and feasibility of that procedure in terminating Palestinian resistance and will it end-up in finding other forces, closer to the Zionists and to their demands, to take over power? Will the new Authority or its leadership be able to control things and bypass the expected differences within the Fatah organization and between Fatah and other security forces or among those forces themselves? What is the impact of all this on the intifada and resistance?

Will such a resolution win American approval in the light of estimates that no such measure could be taken without an American green light?

What is the expected Arab reaction and will it lead to Zionist battles with neighboring Arab countries? And what will be the effect of all that on the peace treaties signed with some Arab countries?

What will be the nature of international reactions and will they lead to internationalizing the conflict or will the USA be able to curb European reactions?

The Shabak report though considering it more likely that secular forces that are closer to the Zionists would take over power after fall of Arafat’s Authority, yet it did not answer the question about the American stand. The Americans are not ready to accept a plan that could endanger the whole region’s security, diminish American hegemony over the area and weaken influence of pro-America Arab countries. The plan could also lead those countries to war against the Zionists after canceling the peace treaties with the Zionist entity under popular pressures. Some Arab countries, especially Syria, Egypt and Iraq, might get involved in such a confrontation.

Developments in the occupied territories and the probable spread in confrontations with occupation forces leading to greater casualties in their lines pushed the enemy’s government to retain the situation as is. It also favored increasing the strikes against the Palestinian people and damaging PA’s infrastructure especially those of the police force that was charged of participating or supporting resistance operations against the Zionist entity.

The Sharon government was greatly hesitant in endorsing the plan to wipe out the PA in view of its massive ramifications. The ‘Foreign Report’ said on 12/7 that the occupation army had presented a plan to the government recently envisaging an all-out military operation against the PA.

Latest developments including the assassination of big numbers of intifada and resistance activists and expanding the scope of assassinations to include political figures from Hamas as what happened in the city of Nablus when two prominent Hamas leaders (Jamal Mansour and Jamal Salim) were assassinated point out that Sharon had changed his plan to exterminate the PA into another comprehensive escalatory scheme, though gradual one, against all forces of the Palestinian people in addition to the PA. Sharon’s new plot targets driving the PA to surrender and weakening and exhausting capabilities of the resistance factions to furnish the way before the PA to accept occupation dictates and conditions.

The Sharon government through gradual implementation of that plan could reduce the international community’s negative reaction to its savage operations and consequently help the American administration to continue in providing a suitable political cover and preventing success of any European initiative to condemn those operations or passing resolutions against them at the Security Council. The American stand was noticeably hesitant in denouncing the recent Nablus operation, which indicates that such operations must have secured an American green light.

Furthermore, graduating Zionist aggressive measures against the Palestinian people would prolong life of the Zionist coalition government. Sharon’s all-out war against the Palestinians and destroying the PA in the face of an opposition on the part of Peres and his labor comrades to such type of war would lead to disintegration of the government, which both parties (Likud and Labor) are keen on its continuation in the present stage. Peres actually tried to dissuade the Sharon government against carrying out the plan to terminate the PA tabling a foreign ministry report in the process, which affirmed that Arafat was exerting real efforts to halt the intifada. However, the report noted that success of Arafat’s attempt necessitated Zionist government political initiatives aimed at resuming negotiations and implementing the third stage of the re-deployment plan. Although Sharon refused to discuss this report at the pretext that it would carry negative impact on the government’s stand towards the PA but he might have been convinced to postpone the army’s plan or at least amend its timing.

However, the question here is: What will the Zionist reaction be to a big martyrdom operation that might take place in the coming days?

There are certain estimates that Sharon would seize the opportunity to launch his sweeping aggression against the PA and the Palestinian people and would ignore the aforementioned considerations. There are no enough indications to support such an expectation with the exception of the well-known nature of Sharon who some say did not change since 1982. In spite of all that the repercussions of the comprehensive operation would still remain colossal and carry negative effects on the enemy that would make Sharon and others think twice before embarking on it.

The PA showed hesitance towards Sharon despite its conviction that it would not achieve any political gains with him in power and despite its continuous attempts to bring his downfall and persuade the Zionist street to elect a less fanatic leader. Apparently the security and military pressures in addition to diplomacy contributed in weakening the PA’s position in the face of Zionist arrogance and aggression. This led to absence of a unified political program for all forces of the Palestinian people that would be in harmony with the field unity on the ground, which was achieved through unanimity on resistance program. The Arab countries failure to unite on a strategy to deal with the Zionist entity and to support the Palestinian people and their resistance further weakened the PA. Probably some Arab countries even exercised pressures on the PA to accept Tenet’s proposals and conditions of the so-called ceasefire.

In return, the Palestinian arena witnessed an unprecedented unity on the resistance program. Such a stand was actualized on the ground through escalation of armed attacks against Zionist settlers and the increase in operations against Zionist targets within the 1967 occupied lands and in the Zionist depth. Moreover, other major Palestinian organizations shared in such operations particularly the Fatah Movement and the Popular Front in addition to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which signaled a big change in favor of the resistance option. This was also evident in the angry masses’ demonstration in Gaza Strip who were protesting against certain elements of the PA security men for shooting at Mujahideen while returning from an operation that fired mortar shells at Zionist settlements near Gaza.

Hence, the enemy’s government choice to escalate war against the Palestinian people would not put an end to Palestinian resistance. Even if certain Palestinian parties would be preoccupied in the event PA leaders were absented from the arena, this would not affect in the long run the continuation of resistance. Maybe it would even lead to its escalation and development after things get squared out because any future Palestinian leadership would not be able to defy the resistance determination that is deeply rooted in the Palestinian people.